TheReak v State of SimDemocracy 2023 Civ 1

TheReak v State of SimDemocracy 2023 Civ 1

Date of judgment	20th February 2023
Judge	Chief Justice halfcat
Grounds	Common law tort of Uncompensated Expropriation (Article 22\)
Verdict	D liable for common law tort of Uncompensated Expropriation against P
Result	D had to pay 15,000 Tau in damages to P�D had to pay P’s legal fees
Applicable persuasive precedent	Criminal offences are not prima facie common law torts, 4 The alleged common law tort of Abuse of Discretion, mirroring that of the Criminal Code, does not exist, 19 The common law tort of Uncompensated Expropriation is the direct or indirect expropriation of private property by the state, which has not been abandoned and could not reasonably be expected to be expropriated, without giving fair compensation to affected parties, 20 Remedies for the above tort is fair compensation for the private property and/or business lost, 20

Introduction

[1]. The plaintiff is suing the State of SimDemocracy for abuse of discretion, alleging that by selling the ⁠No Access channel to the plaintiff and then two weeks later passing an Executive Order which created a national election debate channel Deadguy, then President, committed the crime of abuse of discretion, which the plaintiff proposes be recognized as a tort under common law under Article 22 of the Civil Code.

Facts of the case

[2]. On the 18th of January, the plaintiff purchases the channel known as ⁠No Access in the Economy category of the SimDemocracy Discord from Deadguy for the price of 15.000. The plaintiff then holds a Presidential debate for the subsequent Presidential election, but does not hold a Senatorial debate the week afterwards. Shortly thereafter Deadguy, now President, passes an Executive Order which creates a channel known as ⁠election-debates which is to hold debates and where candidates are to be “heavily encouraged” to participate by the Government.

Is the Criminal Code relevant in civil court?

[3]. Before moving on to the substance of the argumentation, we must first deal with some related questions. In their argumentation, the plaintiff urges the Court to recognize the crimes listed in the Criminal Code as torts, and argues that if something is listed as a crime it is by nature illegal and should therefore also be listed as a tort. This is especially important due to the fact that private citizens can not prosecute for crimes and should therefore be given the opportunity to achieve justice through civil court, according to the plaintiff.

[4]. The Court rejects this view. Civil law and criminal law serve two entirely different purposes and all crimes do not constitute infractions, just as all infractions do not constitute crimes. The Criminal Code may serve as a guide, but it is not binding and will therefore not be recognized as a tort.

[5]. That being the case, the allegation that the Executive Order benefited the State’s private or personal interests is entirely irrelevant, as it is only a precondition for the crime of Abuse of Discretion being committed and not a measure of if any harm has been done to the plaintiff, which is what concerns the civil court.

Is the State of SimDemocracy liable?

[6]. Another question which must be dealt with is the question of liability. The plaintiff has chosen to sue the State of SimDemocracy, as it is the one who served the Executive Order on behalf of then President Deadguy. However, as is clear in the evidence it was Deadguy personally, prior to becoming President, who sold the property to the plaintiff, and then after becoming the President who passed the Executive Order effectively nationalizing the business.

[7]. As Deadguy is not a party to this case, the Court will not rule definitively on their liability, however, the Court is certain that the State of SimDemocracy can not be held liable for actions taken personally by the aforementioned individual who at the time was not representing the State. The sale of the property thus becomes immaterial to this particular case. The Executive Order however is still relevant.

Was there any harm done to the plaintiff?

[8]. Now that we have narrowed down the evidence to only what is relevant, we may answer the question of if there was any harm done to the plaintiff.

[9]. The plaintiff argues that by nationalizing election debates through an Executive Order, the State has run the plaintiff out of business, and consequently harmed them.

[10]. The defendant however argues that the plaintiff is responsible for the loss of value themselves due to them failing to host a senatorial debate, and that the Executive Order was only passed because it appeared that the plaintiff was not going to host any more debates. Additionally they argue that the matter of hosting debates is of such importance that any loss of value for the plaintiff is irrelevant, as it is the government’s job to deal with issues of national importance.

[11]. The Court will deal with these arguments separately, starting with whether the State’s Executive Order caused any harm to the plaintiff. The Court finds that it did. The State creating an election debate channel is essentially guaranteed to run the plaintiff out of business, as the reach and influence of the State is much greater than any individual. The Court determines that by going through with such an act, the State is directly responsible for the decrease in value of the plaintiff’s property.

[12]. The defendant retorts that because the plaintiff missed hosting a Senatorial debate, the plaintiff forced the State’s hand in nationalizing election debates. The Court finds this argument unconvincing. Missing just one debate does not inherently mean that the debates were indefinitely canceled, and any such assumptions are unreasonable.

[13]. The Court additionally finds the argument that the plaintiff, by missing one Senatorial debate destroyed their own credibility, and that therefore any loss of interest in their debates would be caused by their own, rather than the State’s actions, entirely uncompelling. The suggestion that the plaintiff could have continued their debates regardless is also unreasonable, as the interest in such debates would be greatly lessened by the State’s actions.

[14]. The Court finds it overwhelmingly clear that the State’s actions were the greatest contributor to the loss of value of the plaintiff’s property and that no arguments to the contrary demonstrate any reasonable objections.

[15]. Finally however, the defendant argues that while the State may have caused the loss of value of the plaintiff’s property, this fact is irrelevant due to election debates being of national importance, and the State therefore possessing the right to nationalize it at any time.

[16]. Here the distinction between criminal and civil law becomes especially important. The Court does not contend the State’s right to nationalize election debates, or any other industry for that matter. However, the Court finds that the legality is irrelevant. As the plaintiff could not have reasonably predicted that their property would suffer such a loss of value due to the actions of the State, the State has a responsibility to reimburse the plaintiff for any damages caused as a result of the State’s unfair position in the market.

[17]. The Court finds that the state can not steal, or expropriate, any private property without fair compensation, unless the property has been abandoned. The Court also finds that in the present matter, the property had not been abandoned, and that the State through their actions indirectly expropriated the plaintiff’s property through exerting their unfair position in the market.

Torts under Common Law

[18]. Before giving a verdict however there is one more complication which must be dealt with. As no appropriate tort for the matter exists, the plaintiff decided to sue under Article 22 of the Civil Code which allows the Court to establish torts under common law. Unfortunately however, the Civil Code is rather unclear on the exact process of establishing these torts. The Court will therefore provide an explanation of its interpretation.

[19]. Article 22 §2 states that a plaintiff may propose a new tort under common law if no appropriate already existing tort exists, the plaintiff did this by proposing that the Criminal Code, and specifically Article 36 – Abuse of Discretion, be recognized as a tort. As established prior, the Court will not be doing this.

[20]. Article 22 §2.2 however, states that if the presiding Judge chooses to recognize a common law tort, they are the one who will specify the name and definition of the tort. The Court takes this to mean that although the plaintiff may propose that a tort with a certain name or definition be recognized, it is ultimately the presiding Judge’s decision on what the tort will be named and how it will be defined, even if it shares very little in common with the original proposal. The Court will therefore be establishing the tort of uncompensated expropriation as defined below.

Uncompensated Expropriation

§1. Uncompensated expropriation is to be the direct or indirect expropriation of private property, which has not been abandoned and could not reasonably be expected to be expropriated, by the State without fairly compensating the affected parties.

§2. Remedies available for uncompensated expropriation shall be fair compensation for the private property and/or business lost.

Verdict

[21]. The Court finds the defendant liable for uncompensated expropriation as the State has indirectly expropriated the plaintiff’s business, without giving them fair compensation.

[22]. The Court orders the defendant to pay 15.000 in the national currency as fair compensation to the plaintiff, as well as any legal fees incurred by the plaintiff.